Seminar of economic and social research college (No. 41)

Partisan and Bipartisan Gerrymandering

Lecture| April 14, 2017/3:00-4:15 p.m. | 106B meeting room in Zhonghui building
Speaker: PAN Zhen-yu
Sponsor: Economic and social research college of Jinan University.

ABOUT PAN ZHEN-YU
Assistant professor of College of Economics & Management and fiscal and taxation department in Wuhan University, graduated from American Boston College and got his PhD in economics in August, 2014. His major research fields include political economics, public economics and regional economics, especially focus on the American electoral system analysis and the relationship between local public goods supply and the population movement.

ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one-sidedly biased district prole, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district prole. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy. Friedman and Holden (2009) nd no significant empirical difference between bipartisan and partisan gerrymandering in explaining incumbent reelection rates. Our result suggests that gerrymanderers may not be as free in redistricting as popularly thought